What is the role of communication technology and media in making American society more adaptive, equitable, and democratic? Analyzing the field of communication against an in-depth picture of American society, this provocative, wide-ranging text explores how communication enterprises are intrinsically linked to the establishment and maintenance of social power. Throughout the book, changes in communication capabilities are related to changes in wealth and income distribution, the structures of economic organizations, work and the professions, minorities, law and government, urbanization, popular culture, (...) and globalization. In an engaging narrative the author presents empirical evidence that suggests that popular beliefs about the democratic role of media and communications often are misguided. While we are in an information age, it is not an information revolution that can liberate society. Emphasizing new technologies and media in contemporary American society, Rossides shows how most forms of social communication throughout history—language, gestures, clothing, buildings and spaces, ships and railroads—have sustained social power. (shrink)

Social Theory: Its Origins, History, and Contemporary Relevance analyzes the tradition of social theory in terms of its origins and changes in kind of societies ...

Moral distress in healthcare has been an increasingly prevalent topic of discussion. Most authors characterize it as a negative phenomenon, while few have considered its potentially positive value. In this essay, I argue that moral distress can reveal and affirm some of our most important concerns as moral agents. Indeed, the experience of it under some circumstances appears to be partly constitutive of an honorable character and can allow for crucial moral maturation. The potentially positive value, then, is twofold; moral (...) distress carries both aretaic and instrumental value. Granted, this position is not without its caveats, but by making these clear, I provide a novel framework for policy recommendations regarding when, if ever, we should work to reduce moral distress. (shrink)

Recent medical and bioethics literature shows a growing concern for practitioners’ emotional experience and the ethical environment in the workplace. Moral distress, in particular, is often said to result from the difficult decisions made and the troubling situations regularly encountered in health care contexts. It has been identified as a leading cause of professional dissatisfaction and burnout, which, in turn, contribute to inadequate attention and increased pain for patients. Given the natural desire to avoid these negative effects, it seems to (...) most authors that systematic efforts should be made to drastically reduce moral distress, if not altogether eliminate it from the lives of vulnerable practitioners. Such efforts, however, may be problematic, as moral distress is not adequately understood, nor is there agreement among the leading accounts regarding how to conceptualize the experience. With this article I make clear what a robust account of moral distress should be able to explain and how the most common notions in the existing literature leave significant explanatory gaps. I present several cases of interest and, with careful reflection upon their distinguishing features, I establish important desiderata for an explanatorily satisfying account. With these fundamental demands left unsatisfied by the leading accounts, we see the persisting need for a conception of moral distress that can capture and delimit the range of cases of interest. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence and robotic technologies have become nearly ubiquitous. In some ways, the developments have likely helped us, but in other ways sophisticated technologies set back our interests. Among the latter sort is what has been dubbed the ‘severance problem’—the idea that technologies sever our connection to the world, a connection which is necessary for us to flourish and live meaningful lives. I grant that the severance problem is a threat we should mitigate and I ask: how can we stave (...) it off? In particular, the fact that some technologies exhibit behavior that is unclear to us seems to constitute a kind of severance. Building upon contemporary work on moral responsibility, I argue for a mechanism I refer to as ‘technological answerability’, namely the capacity to recognize human demands for answers and to respond accordingly. By designing select devices—such as robotic assistants and personal AI programs—for increased answerability, we see at least one way of satisfying our demands for answers and thereby retaining our connection to a world increasingly occupied by technology. (shrink)

In a landmark essay, Andreas Matthias claimed that current developments in autonomous, artificially intelligent (AI) systems are creating a so-called responsibility gap, which is allegedly ever-widening and stands to undermine both the moral and legal frameworks of our society. But how severe is the threat posed by emerging technologies? In fact, a great number of authors have indicated that the fear is thoroughly instilled. The most pessimistic are calling for a drastic scaling-back or complete moratorium on AI systems, while the (...) optimists aim to show that the gap can be bridged nonetheless. Contrary to both camps, I argue against the prevailing assumption that there is a technology-based responsibility gap. I show how moral responsibility is a dynamic and flexible process, one that can effectively encompass emerging technological entities. (shrink)

This 1997 work is a book-length treatment of the unique nature and development of Nietzsche's post-Zarathustran political philosophy. This later political philosophy is set in the context of the critique of modernity that Nietzsche advances in the years 1885–1888, in such texts as Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, The Case of Wagner, and Ecce Homo. In this light Nietzsche's own diagnosis of the ills of modernity is subject to the same (...) criticism that he himself levelled against previous philosophies; that it is an involuntary symptom of the age it represents. Nietzsche is seen to be aware of his own decadence and of his complicity with the very tendencies that he dissects and deplores. By relating the political philosophy, the critique of modernity and the theory of decadence Daniel Conway has written a powerful book about Nietzsche's own appreciation of the limitations of both his writing style and of his famous prophetic 'stance'. (shrink)

As an economist, I was raised on the milk of prescriptive consequentialism. The theoretical architecture of rational choice, welfare economics, and its applied version—benefit-cost analysis—was offered up as the definitive answer to a wide range of public policy problems. Welfare economics was alleged to offer value-free solutions to value-laden policy debates. Symbolic of this confidence is the claim by Milton Friedman:[C]urrently in the Western world, and especially in the United States, differences about economic policy among disinterested citizens derive predominantly from (...) different predictions about the economic consequences of taking action—differences that in principle can be eliminated by the progress of.. (shrink)

How shall we understand apparently teleological systems? What explains their persistence and their plasticity? Here I argue that all seemingly goal-directed systems—e.g., a food-seeking organism, human-made devices like thermostats and torpedoes, biological development, human goal seeking, and the evolutionary process itself—share a common organization. Specifically, they consist of an entity that moves within a larger containing structure, one that directs its behavior in a general way without precisely determining it. If so, then teleology lies within the domain of the theory (...) of compositional hierarchies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility”Daniel W. Shuman (bio)Stephen Braude’s essay, “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility,” discusses a number of important issues about the moral and legal responsibility of persons diagnosed with multiple personality disorder (MPD), known in DSM-IV as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). One issue that is fundamental to this debate, which Braude does not address, however, is the empirical reality underlying the debate. Does MPD/DID (...) exist? A prerequisite to a debate about the legal consequences of MPD/DID is legally sufficient proof of its existence and its behavioral consequences.Proof that MPD/DID exists, its impact on legal standards of responsibility, and that the defendant suffers from it, must come from expert testimony; it is not part of the common knowledge or experience of the typical judge or juror. Courts are, however, increasingly, unwilling to assume that because an expert has impressive qualifications, he or she will necessarily present scientifically valid evidence. Particularly in cases of psychiatric and psychological evidence, courts that once looked solely at the expert’s qualifications to determine the admissibility for expert scientific evidence, now understand that the expert’s qualifications are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the presentation of accurate expert testimony. Courts increasingly want to know how experts know what they claim to know and whether their methods of knowing meet the hallmarks of good science.Thus, from a legal standpoint, a prerequisite to admissibility of the evidence that serves as a basis for a discussion of the legal implications of MPD/DID is rigorous scientific proof of its existence. Proof of the existence of MPD/DID has not, however, been the subject of rigorous scientific research, but instead has consisted of non-falsifiable clinical experience where the risk of iatrogenesis (i.e., hypnosis and suggestion) is ever present. While these clinical observations and opinions may ultimately be proven valid by subsequent research, there is simply no way to know whether that is so in the absence of rigorous scientific research. If proof of the existence of MPD/DID is clinically but not scientifically grounded, legal rules based upon it are suspect. Moreover, claims of MPD/DID often arise in a legal context where there are significant benefits to be gained from receiving the diagnosis which heightens the importance of rigorous scientific scrutiny.Diagnostic validity and reliability matters in different ways in the forensic context than it does in the therapeutic context. These contextual differences [End Page 59] are reflected in disparate standards for scrutinizing each. There is no threshold requirement, for example, that a psychotherapist prove that a diagnostic category is valid or that a psychotherapeutic treatment used for a person suffering from it is generally recognized as safe and effective before using it; however, there is a threshold requirement of rigorous scientific scrutiny before admission of this information in evidence. If a therapist’s diagnostic hypothesis that there are two personality states influencing a patient’s behavior is not borne out, it can be revised in later sessions. Even if MPD/DID does not exist, treatment that assumes it does may nonetheless be effective because therapeutic outcome is more closely tied to the nature of the therapist-patient relationship than the content of therapy, or because multiple personality states is an effective therapeutic metaphor. Moreover, if the patient is not satisfied that the diagnosis or treatment rendered is helpful, the patient can leave therapy or seek another therapist.In contrast, judicial determinations are a one-shot determination which cannot be revisited in light of subsequently acquired knowledge. The defendant/patient is not free to change courts, or withdraw from the legal proceedings. Thus, it would be entirely appropriate for psychiatrists and psychologists to treat patients presenting symptoms of what they label MPD/DID and for courts to reject exculpatory evidence from psychiatrists and psychologists of that disorder.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Multiple Personality and Moral ResponsibilityCommentary: Commentary by ClarkCommentary: Commentary by ShumanDaniel W. Shuman Daniel W. Shuman, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75235, USA.Copyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This study examines firms that have experienced an industrial and/or environ-mental crisis and proposes that top management team (TMT) characteristics will affect a firm's ability to minimize the severity of these crisis events. Specifically, heterogeneity in the TMT will exhibit a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship with the severity of firm crises. Our results suggest that a moderate level of age and tenure heterogeneity are positively related to a firm's ability to successfully minimize the severity of crises. Variance in educational backgrounds was (...) unrelated to crisis severity. Functional background heterogeneity exhibited a curvilinear relationship with crisis severity but was not U-shaped as hypothesized. (shrink)

The _Physics_ is a foundational work of western philosophy, and the crucial one for understanding Aristotle's views on matter, form, essence, causation, movement, space, and time. This richly annotated, scrupulously accurate, and consistent translation makes it available to a contemporary English reader as no other does—in part because it fits together seamlessly with other closely associated works in the New Hackett Aristotle series, such as the _Metaphysics_, _De Anima_, and forthcoming _De Caelo_ and _On Coming to Be and Passing Away_. (...) Eventually the series will include all of Aristotle's works. Sequentially numbered endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index of Terms indicates places where focused discussion of key notions occurs. An illuminating general Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what sort of work it is and what sorts of evidence it relies on. (shrink)

This paper introduces the real core model K() and determines the extent of scales in this inner model. K() is an analog of Dodd-Jensen's core model K and contains L(), the smallest inner model of ZF containing the reals R. We define iterable real premice and show that Σ1∩() has the scale property when vR AD. We then prove the following Main Theorem: ZF + AD + V = K() DC. Thus, we obtain the Corollary: If ZF + AD +()L() (...) is consistent, then ZF + AD + DC + α < ω2 -AD is also consistent. (shrink)

Medical errors are all too common. Ever since a report issued by the Institute of Medicine raised awareness of this unfortunate reality, an emerging theme has gained prominence in the literature on medical error. Fears of blame and punishment, it is often claimed, allow errors to remain undisclosed. Accordingly, modern healthcare must shift away from blame towards a culture of safety in order to effectively reduce the occurrence of error. Against this shift, I argue that it would serve the medical (...) community well to retain notions of individual responsibility and blame in healthcare settings. In particular, expressions of moral emotions—such as guilt, regret and remorse—appear to play an important role in the process of disclosing harmful errors to patients and families. While such self-blaming responses can have negative psychological effects on the individual practitioner, those who take the blame are in the best position to offer apologies and show that mistakes are being taken seriously, thereby allowing harmed patients and families to move forward in the wake of medical error. (shrink)

According to a popular family of theories, assertions and other communicative acts should be understood as attempts to change the context of a conversation. Contexts, on this view, are publicly shared bodies of information that evolve over the course of a conversation and that play a range of semantic and pragmatic roles. I argue that this view is mistaken: performing a communicative act requires aiming to change the mind of one’s addressee, but not necessarily the context. Although changing the context (...) may sometimes be among a speaker’s aims, this should be seen as an extra-communicative aim, rather than one that is necessary for the performance of a communicative act. Along the way, I also argue that contexts needn’t play a role in linking anaphora to their antecedents. On the view that I defend, theories that take publicly shared contexts to play an essential role in the nature of communicative acts or anaphoric dependence conflate an artifact introduced by idealized models of conversation with a feature of the phenomenon being modeled. (shrink)

Explaining the Cosmos is a major reinterpretation of Greek scientific thought before Socrates. Focusing on the scientific tradition of philosophy, Daniel Graham argues that Presocratic philosophy is not a mere patchwork of different schools and styles of thought. Rather, there is a discernible and unified Ionian tradition that dominates Presocratic debates. Graham rejects the common interpretation of the early Ionians as "material monists" and also the view of the later Ionians as desperately trying to save scientific philosophy from Parmenides' (...) criticisms. In Graham's view, Parmenides plays a constructive role in shaping the scientific debates of the fifth century BC. Accordingly, the history of Presocratic philosophy can be seen not as a series of dialectical failures, but rather as a series of theoretical advances that led to empirical discoveries. Indeed, the Ionian tradition can be seen as the origin of the scientific conception of the world that we still hold today. (shrink)

This two-part volume collects the complete fragments and most important testimonies for the leading presocratic philosophers. The Greek and Latin texts are translated on facing pages and accompanied by a brief commentary for each philosopher.

Robotic and artificially intelligent (AI) systems are becoming prevalent in our day-to-day lives. As human interaction is increasingly replaced by human–computer and human–robot interaction (HCI and HRI), we occasionally speak and act as though we are blaming or praising various technological devices. While such responses may arise naturally, they are still unusual. Indeed, for some authors, it is the programmers or users—and not the system itself—that we properly hold responsible in these cases. Furthermore, some argue that since directing blame or (...) praise at technology itself is unfitting, designing systems in ways that encourage such practices can only exacerbate the problem. On the other hand, there may be good moral reasons to continue engaging in our natural practices, even in cases involving AI systems or robots. In particular, daily interactions with technology may stand to impact the development of our moral practices in human-to-human interactions. In this paper, we put forward an empirically grounded argument in favor of some technologies being designed for social responsiveness. Although our usual practices will likely undergo adjustments in response to innovative technologies, some systems which we encounter can be designed to accommodate our natural moral responses. In short, fostering HCI and HRI that sustains and promotes our natural moral practices calls for a co-developmental process with some AI and robotic technologies. (shrink)

Our ability to locate moral responsibility is often thought to be a necessary condition for conducting morally permissible medical practice, engaging in a just war, and other high-stakes endeavors. Yet, with increasing reliance upon artificially intelligent systems, we may be facing a wideningresponsibility gap, which, some argue, cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility. How then, if at all, can we make use of crucial emerging technologies? According to Colin Allen and Wendell Wallach, the advent of so-called ‘artificial moral (...) agents’ (AMAs) is inevitable. Still, this notion may seem to push back the problem, leaving those who have an interest in developing autonomous technology with a dilemma. We may need to scale-back our efforts at deploying AMAs (or at least maintain human oversight); otherwise, we must rapidly and drastically update our moral and legal norms in a way that ensures responsibility for potentially avoidable harms. This paper invokes contemporary accounts of responsibility in order to show how artificially intelligent systems might be held responsible. Although many theorists are concerned enough to develop artificial conceptions ofagencyor to exploit our present inability to regulate valuable innovations, the proposal here highlights the importance of—and outlines a plausible foundation for—a workable notion ofartificial moral responsibility. (shrink)

In an era of domestic and economic reform wherein deregulation/privatisation becomes a priority, short shift has too often been given to evaluative analyses of business activities. Evaluative monitoring and oversight are especially needful in highly competitive international business environments, where the temptations are very strong to adjudge individual effectiveness by the sole criterion of the bottom line. But what additional or alternative criteria should be administered, and by whom, is less clear. That any but the most vague Judeo-Christian or secular (...) ethical standards are applicable (e.g. notions of fairness) is widely contested. The debate is significantly only widened when doing business across national borders involving peoples from different cultures and languages. This section is devoted to explicating the normative role of international codes of conduct for guiding the decision making of managers involved in multinational operations, and clarifying what ethical frameworks are available to the international manager for taking decisions which require selecting actions inconsistent with either home or host country demands. (shrink)

Despite his attack on metaphysical speculation, Nietzsche is generally received as a closet realist who identifies objective reality with a primordial chaos. By portraying Nietzsche as a metaphysical realist, this standard interpretation attributes to him the privileged "God's eye point of view" that his perspectivism discredits. Some readers attempt to salvage Nietzsche from the scrap heap of realism by presenting perspectivism as continuous with some strain of antirealism. But these attempts often ignore Nietzsche's apparent embrace of the categories and vocabulary (...) of realism. I argue that Nietzsche is perhaps best described as an antirealist who appreciates the pragmatic advantages of realism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Life as Will to Power Nietzsche contra “English Darwinism” Life as Self‐Overcoming The Case of Nietzsche The Law of Life Concluding Critical Remarks.

It is generally held that Presocratic cosmologies are sui generis and unique to their authors. If, however, a division is made between sixth-century and fifthcentury BC cosmologies, some salient differences emerge. For instance, heavenly bodies in sixth-century cosmologies tend to be light, ephemeral, fed by vapors, and located above the earth; those in fifth-century cosmologies tend to be heavy, permanent, heated by friction, and to travel below the earth. The earlier cosmologies seem to embody a meteorological model of astronomy, the (...) latter a lithic model. The change in models can be accounted for on the basis of Parmenides’ discovery that the moon is illuminated by the sun and hence is a spherical, permanent, opaque or earthy body. This insight generated empirical evidence to confirm itself and rendered obsolete earlier cosmologies. (shrink)

This paper was originally a discussion proposal but data has been collected since June and we would like to share some results in this proceedings article. Our goal is to link the CSR literature with the social entrepreneurship literature by studying the growth of an international organization and discuss our methodologies and findings to date.

Asim Barut once,en passant, asked the question “For what transitions of the hydrogen atom do the spectral lines coincide”? It is a pleasure for us to give the answer in this paper.

Philosophers of language inspired by Grice have long sought to show how facts about reference boil down to facts about speakers’ communicative intentions. I focus on a recent attempt by Stephen Neale (2016), who argues that referring with an expression requires having a special kind of communicative intention—one that involves representing an occurrence of the expression as standing in some particular relation to its referent. Neale raises a problem for this account: because some referring expressions are unpronounced, most language users (...) don’t realize they exist, and so seemingly don’t have intentions about them. Neale suggests that we might solve this problem by supposing that speakers have nonconscious or “tacit” intentions. I argue that this solution can’t work by arguing that our representations of unpronounced bits of language all occur within a modular component of the mind, and so we can’t have intentions about them. From this line of thought, I draw several conclusions. (i) The semantic value of a referring expression is not its referent, but rather a piece of partial and defeasible evidence about what a speaker refers to when using it literally. (ii) There is no interesting sense in which speakers refer with expressions; referring expressions are used to give evidence about the sort of singular proposition one intends to communicate. (iii) The semantics–pragmatics interface is coincident with the interface between the language module and central cognition. (shrink)

The consensus among evolutionists seems to be that the morphological complexity of organisms increases in evolution, although almost no empirical evidence for such a trend exists. Most studies of complexity have been theoretical, and the few empirical studies have not, with the exception of certain recent ones, been especially rigorous; reviews are presented of both the theoretical and empirical literature. The paucity of evidence raises the question of what sustains the consensus, and a number of suggestions are offered, including the (...) possibility that certain cultural and/or perceptual biases are at work. In addition, a shift in emphasis from theoretical to empirical inquiry is recommended for the study of complexity, and guidelines for future empirical studies are proposed. (shrink)

Working in ZF+AD alone, we prove that every set of ordinals with cardinality at least Θ can be covered by a set of ordinals in HOD of K (ℝ) of the same cardinality, when there is no inner model with an ℝ-complete measurable cardinal. Here ℝ is the set of reals and Θ is the supremum of the ordinals which are the surjective image of ℝ.

I propose that the interpretation which I present of Nietzsche's central text, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, enables us to construct an account of his positive contribution to moral philosophy. I maintain herein that Nietzsche advances an aretaic moral program. That is, he is primarily concerned not with promoting right action, but with promoting a virtuous state of character. ;Negatively stated, my thesis represents a challenge to the standard interpretation of Nietzsche as an amoral critic who equates the good life with a (...) voluntaristic legislation of anti-social values. I maintain that Nietzsche's famous debunking of the canonical values of the Western moral tradition is in fact designed to clear the way for a revaluation of our approach to morality as an enterprise. According to Nietzsche, virtually all accounts of moral excellence hitherto have presupposed the deficiency of mankind. The moral enterprise has thus been understood as a systematic campaign to improve mankind by redeeming this original deficiency. In short, Nietzsche's critical position comes down to this: man cannot very well flourish if his pursuit of happiness is predicated on a view of himself as morally deficient. ;Nietzsche therefore recommends a moral program which pre- supposes the sufficiency of mankind: human nature requires no improvement in the traditionally moral sense. I have identified as the exemplar of these virtues of self-sufficiency the notorious Ubermensch; here again my interpretation of Nietzsche runs counter to the standard readings of his philosophy. The Ubermensch as a virtuous type is characterized by his command of a coherent and meaningful agency: because his pursuit of the good life is predicated on a prejudice in favor of his own sufficiency, he flourishes. ;Because of the unique problems of presentation which would attend a moral program based on man's sufficiency, I concentrate my attention on a non-standard philosophic text, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Indeed, I propose that Zarathustra embodies Nietzsche's oblique contribution to moral excellence. That is, after having exposed the practicum absurdum of slave morality, he cannot then reject it on moral grounds without thereby compromising his original commitment to man's sufficiency. He therefore restricts himself to an aesthetic critique of slave morality. (shrink)